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Applying this test to Lucas's case,
the Court found it unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented Lucas from building on his
land, but left judgment on the issue to
the South Carolina Supreme Court on
remand. Id TheSouthCaroIinaCoastal
Council's burden on remand, the Court
noted, is to "identify background principles of nuisance and property law
that prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends in the circumstances in which the
property is presently found." Id at
2901-02. Only by sustaining this burden could the State contend that the
Beachfront Management Act's proscription ofall such beneficial uses did
not amount to a taking. Id. at 2902.
With the development of a new test
for regulatory takings in Lucas, the
Supreme Court did not wholly reject
its earlier analyses ofpublic nuisances,
legitimate state interests, or economically viable uses ofprivate land. Rather,
the Lucas test mandates an antecedent
examination of state property and nuisance law to determine whether regulations on land use effect a taking requiring compensation ofthe landowner.
Lower courts may have difficulty
implementing the Lucas test, however,
because the Court outlined the test in
broad terms and did not provide specific guidelines. Consequently, potentialland purchasers must exercise caution and determine if property is subject to implied limitations on its use.
- Joshua D. Bruch
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools: DAMAGES ARE AVAILABLE FOR AN ACTION
BROUGHT TO ENFORCE TITLE
IX OF THE EDUCATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1972.
In a recent unanimous decision, the

United States Supreme Court held that
federal courts have the authority to
award appropriate remedies in actions
brought pursuant to Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 (Title
IX). Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). In so
holding, the Court maintained the gen-

eral principle that absent a clear indication by Congress to the contrary, federal courts have the power to award
appropriate relief in cases brought under a federal statute.
Petitioner, Christine Franklin, was
a student at North Gwinnett High
School in Georgia. Respondent,
Gwinnett County School District, operated the school with federal funds.
On December 29, 1988, Franklin filed
a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, alleging that she had been a
victim ofsexual harassment and abuse
by a teacher, Andrew Hill. She sought
damages pursuant to Title IX, which
provides in part that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." Id. at 1031 n.l
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988».
Subsequent to Franklin filing the complaint, Hill resigned from his position
at North Gwinnett High School on the
condition that all pending matters and
investigations be dropped. The school
closed its investigation.
The district court dismissed
Franklin's complaint, holding that Title
IX does not provide for an award of
damages. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Noting that Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 and
Title VI ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964
have been interpreted similarly, the
appellate court relied on Drayden v.
Needville Indep. Sck Dist., 642 F.2d
129 (5th Cir. 1981), which held that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not provide for an award of damages, as its
authority for not granting damages
under Title IX. The court further reasoned that damages were limited under
statutes that were enacted pursuant to
Congress's Spending Clause power.
Because Title IX was enacted under
the spending clause without an express
provision for damages, the court held
that damages were unavailable. The

United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to settle the conflicting decisions among the circuit courts on the
issue of whether the implied right of
action underTitie IX authorizes a claim
for damages.
In an opinion delivered by Justice
White, the Supreme Court first acknowledged the general rule that
''where legal rights have been invaded
and a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done."
Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1033 (quoting
Bel/v. Hood, 327U.S. 678, 684(1946».
The Court also recognized that affording a remedy for wrongs was deeply
rooted in American history and in support thereof quoted Chief Justice
Marshall's declaration that our govemment"bas been emphatically termed
a government oflaws, and not of men.
It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation, ifthe laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested
legal right." Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at
1033 (quoting Marbury v. Madison,S
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1908».
In arguing that damages should not
be provided under Title IX, Respondents and the United States as amicus
curiae insisted that the presumption in
favor ofdamages no longer existed aDd
emphasized that both the statute and
the legislative intent behind the statute
were silent as to damages. Franklin,
112 S. Ct. at 1034. Respondents contended that regardless ofthe presumption that existed traditionally or at the
time Bell was decided, Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) nullified the presumption by holding that
''the question of who may enforce a
statutory right is fundamentally different from the question of who may
enforce a right that is protected by the
Constitution." Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at
1034 (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 241).
In rejecting this contention, the Court
held that Davis dealt with whether one
had a cause ofaction, not with whether
one was entitled to any relief under a
particular cause of action. Franklin,

___ 23.1 I The Law For u m

21

112 S. Ct. at 1034. The latter, said the
Court, was an entirely different question, and therefore Davis did not alter
the status of the presumption. Id.
Respondents further argued that
GuardiansAss 'nv. CivilServ. Comm 'n
ofNew York City, 463 U.S.582 (1983),
and Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), eroded
the traditional presumption of relief.
Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035. While
acknowledging that the various opinions in Guardians made it difficult to
decipher the majority holding, the Court
determined that the majority held that
damages were available for an intentional violation of a statute similar to
Title IX. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035.
InDarrone, a unanimous court awarded
backpay for another similar statute. Id.
Thus, these cases, reasoned the Court,
actually supported the presumption in
favor of awarding damages. Id.
The Court then addressed Respondents' contention that Congress was
silent with regard to damages in both
the text and the legislative history of
the statute. The Court noted that because Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), held that
Title IX did not provide for an express
right of action, it was not surprising
that the statute was silent regarding
remedies. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035.
The Court asserted that it was necessary to look to the state of the law when
Congress passed Title IX to determine
whether remedies were available. Id.
at 1036. In so doing, the Court held
that the traditional presumption in favor of remedies existed at the time
Title IX was enacted, and that neither
subsequent case law nor statutes had
altered the presumption. Id. Damages,
therefore, were available for an action
brought pursuant to Title IX. Id. at
1036-37.
The Respondents also argued that
an award of damages would violate the
doctrine of separation of powers, that
the presumption in favor of damages
did not apply when Congress enacts a
statute pursuant to its Spending Clause
power, and that if damages were avail22

able, they should be limited to backpay
and prospective relief. Id. at 1037. In
rejecting the argument that a damages
award would violate the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court asserted that the discretion to award relief did not increase judicial power or
impinge on areas that were reserved to
the executive and legislative branches.
Id. The doctrine of separation of powers would actually be hanned if courts
were permitted to decide against awarding damages, as such adjudication
would frustrate and make useless causes
of action authorized by Congress. Id.
Continuing its analysis, the Court
rejected the argument that the traditional presumption should not apply to
statutes enacted pursuant to Congress's
Spending Clause power. Id. The Court
observed that in Pennhurst State Sch.
and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I
(1981), remedies were limited under
the Spending Clause power when the
violation involved was unintentional
because there was no notice of liability. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1037. The
Court distinguished the instant case by
concluding that the problem of notice
was not implicated when the violation
involved was intentional. Id.
The Court also declined to limit the
remedy under the statute to backpay
and prospective relief, because they
were inappropriate and insufficient. Id.
at 1038. The remedy of backpay was
useless here because Ms. Franklin was
a student at the time of the violation,
and prospective relief was insufficient
because Ms. Franklin no longer attended public school and Hill no longer
taught at the school. Id. In addition,
such limitations abandoned the traditional approach of allowing courts to
decide the extent of remedies when a
federal right has been violated. Id.
By holding that damages were available to enforce an action pursuant to
Title IX, the Franklin court emphasized the importance of providing remedies for wrongs committed in violation offederal statutes. Because of the
diversity on the Supreme Court, unanimous decisions are rare. Thus, on the

heels of Justice Thomas's nomination
hearings and the publicity and awareness that the proceeding brought to the
issue of sexual harassment, it appears
that the issue of sexual harassment
may have been a significant factor in
the Court's decision. Nevertheless, to
rule otherwise would have left Ms.
Franklin and others similarly situated
without any practical recourse under
the law. While this decision will most
likely increase the amount of sexual
harassment cases litigated, hopefully it
will serve as a deterrent as well.
- Cheryl Zak
Hafer v. Melo: STATE OFFICERS,

EVEN WHEN ACTING IN THEIR
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, MAY BE
PERSONALL Y LIABLE FOR
DEPRIVA TION OF CITIZENS'
FEDERAL RIGHTS.
In Hafer v. Me/o, 112 S. C1. 358
(J 991), the United States Supreme
Court ruled that under title 42, section
1983 of the United States Code, state
officials may be held personally liable
when performing functions within their
official capacity. The Court found that
this issue differed with a suit against an
actual state office. In that case, because the state itself is the real party in
interest, the action is futile since states
are immune from civil actions for monetary damages. If, however, state officers are sued personally for their actions in office, the party in interest is
the named person and the state's immunities do not apply.
In 1989, Barbara Hafer ran for the
position of Auditor General of Pennsylvania. While campaigning, it was
alleged that Hafer was given a list of
twenty-one employees in the Auditor
General's office who had secured their
jobs through payments to a fonner
employee. Hafer had promised to fire
the people on the list ifshe was elected.
After winning the election, Hafer fired
eighteen people on the list, including
James Melo, Jr., on the grounds that
they had "bought" their jobs.
Melo and seven others filed suit
against Hafer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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